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Emergent H7N9 influenza A virus has caused multiple public health and financial hardships. While some 
epidemiological studies have recognized infected chickens as an important bridge for human infections, 
the generality of this observation, the minimum infectious dose, and the shedding potential of chickens 
have received conflicting results. We experimentally tested the ability of domestic chickens (Gallus gallus 
domesticus) to transmit H7N9 to co-housed chickens and to several other animal species in an experi-
mental live animal market. Results indicated that an infected chicken failed to initiate viral shedding of 
H7N9 to naIve co-housed chickens. The infected chicken did, however, successfully transmit the virus to 
quail (Cotumix sp.) located directly below the infected chicken cage. Oral shedding by indirectly infected 
quail was, on average, greater than ten-fold that of directly inoculated chickens. Best management 
practices in live animal market systems should consider the position of quail in stacked-cage settings. 
Quail 
Pheasant 
Rabbit 
Pigeon 
House sparrow 
Transmission 
1. Introduction 
Human infections with a newly recognized influenza A virus 
(H7N9) were first reported from Shanghai and Anhui Province 
during the late winter/early spring of 2013 (Gao et aI., 2013). As of 
May 2015, over 650 cases of human infections of this virus have 
been reported in China (ProMED-mail, 2015). For comparison, 
during the time period of 2003 to July 2015, 844 cases of Asian 
strain HSN1 highly pathogenic (HP) influenza A virus (IAV) were 
reported in humans globally, with a case fatality rate of over 50% 
(WHO, 201Sa). Although soon after its emergence the case-fatality 
rate was considerably lower for H7N9 when compared to HSN1 
(Poovorawan et aI., 2013), the number of human cases attributed 
to H7N9 IAV appear to be on pace to surpass those of HSN1 in the 
near future. Thus, humans appear to be more readily infected with 
H7N9 and/or are more frequently exposed to environments that 
are conducive to zoonotic transmission of this virus. 
Several of the early human cases of H7N9 are thought to have 
been associated with poultry contact and/or visiting or working 
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within live-animal markets (Bao et aI., 2013). Thus, some key 
epidemiological characteristics of human infections have been 
suggested as histories of exposure to animals and type of exposure 
to animals, with chickens and visits to live pOUltry markets 
yielding some of the highest percentages for case-patients during 
early periods following the emergence of this virus, respectively 
(Li et aI., 2014). The closure of live poultry markets has been 
shown to significantly reduce the number of human infections in 
select Chinese cities soon after the emergence of H7N9 (Yu et aI., 
2014). Unlike certain highly pathogenic (HP) IAVs (Webster, 2004), 
the lack of clinical signs of disease and death in H7N9 infected 
avian species limits potential early warning systems for human 
cases that are often common for HP IAVs that have zoonotic po-
tential (WHO, 201Sb). 
Live animal markets have a long history of association with 
influenza viruses (Webster, 2004). The prevalence of IAVs in live 
animal markets can be high, as rates of > 25% for some IAVs have 
been reported for both chickens and ducks in a select region of 
China (Ni et aI., 2015). The carryover of some animals for days to 
weeks along with the periodic introduction of naIve animals into 
live animal market settings can provide advantageous conditions 
for the survival, proliferation, and alteration of IAVs, as well as 
conditions that are well-suited for zoonotic transmission of these 
viruses (Webster, 2004).
Chickens have been suggested to be an important reservoir for
H7N9 viruses in live bird markets, as they are readily infected,
shed the virus, and the viruses appear to cause little or no negative
effects to the birds (Zhang et al., 2013). Consequently, multiple
studies have suggested epidemiological relationships of human
infections with the H7N9 virus being associated with chickens in
live-bird markets (Bao et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013). However, a
recent study indicated that the 50% infectious dose of H7N9 in
chickens was higher than expected, thereby suggesting that this
IAV (A/Anhui/1/2013) is not well-adapted to this poultry species
and adaptation may be uneven among different isolates (Spack-
man et al., 2015). This indicates that additional avian species may
play an equal or greater role in the transmission and movement of
this virus and similar viruses in live animal market settings.
A better understanding of the transmission of H7N9 IAV in live-
animals markets is needed to help inform public health and
minimize infections in humans (Bao et al., 2013). Although some
early work has suggested an epidemiological link between human
cases and chickens (Chen et al., 2013), additional species could
play a more significant role in the epidemiology of this virus, as
some recent work has suggested that the virus may replicate in-
efficiently in chickens and this species may be a poor vector of
transmission to other species, including humans (Ku et al., 2014).
For these reasons, the objective of this study was to assess the
capacity and efficiency of transmission of H7N9 in an artificial
multi-species live-animal market. The animals tested included five
avian species (three gallinaceous and two peridomestic) and one
mammalian species (peridomestic and also sold live in markets),
all of which can be found as captive animals sold in or perido-
mestic species living around live animal markets (Amonsin et al.,
2008; Busquets et al., 2010; Cardona et al., 2009; Guan et al., 2013;
Webster, 2004).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Virus
The virus stock used in this experiment was a 2013 human
isolate, A/Anhui/1/2013 obtained from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention as second egg passage stock. Virus was
passaged an additional time in our laboratory by inoculation of
day 10 SPF embryonating hen eggs and allantoic fluid was har-
vested two days later. Stock virus was titrated by plaque assay on
MDCK cells as previously described (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011).
Fig. 1. (A) Experimental setup of four separate stacks of cages for a simulated H7N9 live animal market experiment. Shapes with red fill indicate animals that were
experimentally infected at the beginning of this experiment. Shapes that are not associated with a stack were loose-housed in the animal room to assess the potential of
these animals to transmit the virus to different stacks. (B) Observed transmission within four separate stacks of cages in a simulated H7N9 live animal market experiment.
Shapes with red fill indicate animals that shed virus and seroconverted. Shapes with yellow fill represent animals that seroconverted but did not shed virus. Shapes with
orange fill indicate animals that shed small amounts of virus (on a single DPI) but did not seroconvert. Shapes with white fill represent animals that neither shed virus nor
seroconverted.
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2.2. Study animals
All animal work was carried out in an ABSL-3 building. The
room dimensions were 12′18′ with 12′ ceilings. Air flow was
approximately 15 changes per hour. Animals were housed in
multiple stacks of animal cages to assess viral transmission from
multiple routes (Fig. 1). A total of 6 ring-necked pheasants (Pha-
sianus colchicus), 12 quail (Coturnix sp.), 9 domestic chickens
(Gallus gallus domesticus), 9 rock pigeons (Columba livia), 14 house
sparrows (Passer domesticus), and 8 cottontail rabbits (Sylvilagus
sp.) were used in this experiment. All gallinaceous birds were
young-of-the-year, whereas house sparrows, pigeons, and cot-
tontail rabbits were of unknown ages, but were presumably adults.
Stacks 1, 2, and 3 all contained 3 chickens, 4 quail, 2 pigeons,
3 house sparrows, 2 pheasants, and 2 cottontail rabbits with ani-
mals situated in different locations within the stacks (See Fig. 1 for
stack set up). Stack 4 consisted of 2 cottontail rabbits housed se-
parately in a single row that was level with the bottom level of
stack 3 (Fig. 1). In addition, 3 rock pigeons and 5 house sparrows
were loose in the animal room to potentially vector the virus be-
tween infected (stacks 1 and 2) and uninfected stacks of cages
(stacks 3 and 4; Fig. 1). Food and water were provided ad libitum
and were replaced each day when needed in each animal pen as
well as in multiple feeding stations within the animal room to
accommodate loose-housed birds. Water dishes held between
500–1100 mL, with the largest dishes in the chicken cages. Loose-
housed birds had opportunities to move among all stacks of cages
and food and water stations for these animals were placed both on
the floor of the room and on top of cage stacks; however, these
birds did not have access to the same water as the caged animals.
Animal care and use protocols were approved by the NWRC
(protocol number 2209) and CSU (protocol number 14-5220A).
2.3. Experimental infection
On day 0 post infection (DPI), 1 chicken in stack 1 (top level)
was intranasally inoculated with 100 ml containing approximately
104 PFU of H7N9 (A/Anhui/1/2013) IAV diluted in PBS (Fig. 1). In
addition, 3 chickens in stack 2 (bottom level) were infected with
the same dose of the same virus (Fig. 1). These were the only
animals that were deliberately infected during this study. Conse-
quently, this design allowed the assessment of viral transmission
occurring downward among cage levels (stack 1), upward among
cage levels (stack 2), and through animals vectoring the virus
between infected and uninfected stacks (e.g., loose animals to
stacks 3 and 4; Fig. 1).
Samples were collected during odd days of the experimental
infection from stack 1 from 1 to 21 DPI, during even days from
stack 2 from 2 to 20 DPI, from stacks 3 and 4 on 7, 14, and 21 DPI,
and from loose-housed birds on 21 DPI. All birds were manually
restrained for sample collection of oral swabs and cottontail rab-
bits were anesthetized (intramuscular injection of a 5:1 ratio of
ketamine/xylazine at approximately 100 mg/kg and 20 mg/kg,
respectively) prior to nasal flush collection using 1 mL of BA-1
diluent. In addition, a water and a fecal swab sample were col-
lected during each day (when available) from cages of processed
animals and on 21 DPI (all cages). All swab samples were stored in
1 mL of BA-1 viral transport media and water samples (500 ml)
were stored in 500 ml of BA-1. Samples were transferred to 80 °C
freezers prior to laboratory analyses. Animals were bled on the
following days: 13 and 21 DPI (stack 1), 14 and 21 DPI (stack 2),
and 21 DPI (stacks 3, 4, and loose birds). Blood samples were
centrifuged to separate serumwhich was stored at 80 °C prior to
laboratory analyses.
2.4. Laboratory assays
Pre-exposure serum samples were analyzed by ELISA with the
FlockChecks Avian Influenza MultiS-Screen Antibody Test Kit
(IDEXX Laboratories, Inc, Westbrook, ME) or by standard he-
magglutination inhibition (HI) tests. The ELISA was used to pre-
screen quail and pheasants. All sample-to-negative ratio values
were above a 0.5 threshold that has been suggested for some
species by the manufacturer and were also greater than an alter-
native threshold aimed at balancing sensitivity and specificity
(Shriner et al., 2016). Chickens, pigeons, sparrows, and rabbits
were pre-screened using HI as previously described (Pedersen,
2014). All samples were negative at the lowest sera dilution
(o1:8). Oral swab, fecal swab, and water samples were tested by
plaque assay as previously described (Achenbach and Bowen,
2011). The limit of detection for oral swabs, fecal swabs, and water
samples was 101.0 PFU/mL. Post-experimental serology was con-
ducted with standard HI assays using the inoculation virus on sera
collected during 13 DPI (stack 1), 14 DPI (stack 2), and 21 DPI (all
Table 1
Oral shedding and contact transmission of chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) experimentally infected with variants of H7N9 (A/Anhui/1/2013) influenza A virus during
multiple experimental studies.
Breed Age Route Dose Highest titer
(DPI)
Contact titer
(DPI)
Clinical signs Reference
White leghorn Adult Oculonasal 106 TCID50 104.5 (4)a 10a,b None Kalthoff et al. (2014)
White leghorn 59 wk Intranasal 106 EID50 106.4 (4)c n/a None Pantin-Jackwood et al.
(2014)
Not described 4 wk Intranasal and
Intratracheal
109.6 EID50 102.5 (1–2)d None detected Moderate weight
losse
Ku et al. (2014)
White leghorn 4 wk Intrachoanal 106 EID50 103.6 (4)f 103.4g (2 and 5) None Spackman et al. (2015)
White plymouth
rocks
4 and 10 wk Intrachoanal 106 EID50 105.1 (4)f 103.4g (2 and 5) None Spackman et al. (2015)
Multiple Approximately 6–8 wk Intranasal 104 PFU 103.0 (2) None detected None This study
a Titers calculated as TCID50 equivalents based on RT-qPCR assays.
b Contact titer refers to the maximum titer of a contact chicken (i.e., a naïve chicken placed in direct contact with an experimentally infected chicken).
c Mean titer for that DPI. Results are reported as RRT-PCR log10 EID50 (presumably equivalents)/mL.
d Mean titer for 1–2 DPI when chickens were shedding virus. Results are reported as log10 EID50/mL.
e Moderate pathological lesions were discovered during histopathological examination.
f Mean titer for reported DPI. Results are reported as RRT-PCR Log10 EID50 equivalents/mL. The strain of H7N9 used in this table was from a previous avian experimental
infection (e.g., A/Anhui/1/2013) that had been passaged through a bird.
g Highest mean titer reported among all contact chickens co-housed with focal chickens infected with 106 EID50/mL (Spackman et al., 2015). Additional inoculation doses
used in the experiment produced different titers. Contact transmission was only observed in chickens co-housed with animals infected with high doses of 106 (1/3 and 0/3)
and 107.6 (3/3 and 1/3) for two strains of the virus that had been passaged through a chicken during previous studies. Table is unclear which breed(s) is being presented.
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animals). Serum dilutions of Z1:8 were considered positive for
assessment of serologic responses for all animals tested (Table 1).
3. Results
The viral shedding of experimentally inoculated chickens in
this study was minor. The sole chicken experimentally infected in
stack 1 yielded moderate viral shedding only on 1 and 3 DPI with
titers of 102.1 and 102.3 PFU/mL on those DPI, respectively (Table 2).
The chickens in stack 2, in which all three birds were experi-
mentally inoculated, also yielded only minor viral shedding.
Shedding was observed during 2 DPI (n¼1) and 4 DPI (n¼3), with
titers ranging from a maximum of 103.0 on 2 DPI to 102.5 on 4 DPI
(Table 2).
Evidence of viral transmission was limited to stack 1 in this
study. Although the 2 naïve chickens co-housed with an in-
oculated chicken yielded evidence of serologic activity on at least
one occasion (Chicken two 13 DPI¼1:256; Chicken three 13 and
21 DPI¼1:256), neither of these birds yielded evidence of de-
tectable viral shedding. This suggests that these animals were
exposed to sufficient levels of virus to elicit an immune response,
but insufficient virus to produce a productive infection associated
with detectable levels of virus in oral swab samples.
Of interest, all quail housed directly below the chickens located
in stack 1 shed virus and seroconverted (Table 2), while none of
the naïve chickens co-housed with the inoculated chicken shed
virus in this stack. Quail shed virus as early as 3 days post contact
(DPC) and as late as 11 DPC, with all birds yielding evidence of
shedding on 7 DPC (Table 2). The highest titer of virus detected
from an oral swab of a quail was 103.7 PFU/mL. No other animals
located in this stack (n¼9) yielded evidence of shedding or ser-
oconversions (Table 2). Notably, pigeons were housed in similar
location as were quail within the stack (directly below the chick-
ens; Fig. 1) but failed to show evidence of infection.
Although 120 fecal samples and 101 water samples were col-
lected during multiple time points of the experiment, none were
positive for live virus by plaque assay. This lack of environmental
contamination likely influenced and ultimately limited
transmission within and between the cage stacks. However, the
potential role of environmental contamination from other species
is unknown at this time.
4. Discussion
Chickens have been suggested to be important host species for
H7N9 viruses in live bird markets (Zhang et al., 2013). However,
some recent studies indicate that contact transmission among co-
housed chickens is dependent on the inoculation dose of the in-
fected chicken(s), with higher doses supporting more transmission
(Spackman et al., 2015). Nonetheless, failures of contact trans-
mission have been reported for naïve chickens co-housed with
chickens infected with 109.6 EID50 (Ku et al., 2014), thereby sug-
gesting that chickens infected with high doses, even at levels that
are unlikely in natural settings, may not be the most significant
species of epidemiological interest in live bird markets. However,
the generality of this statement may be influenced by age and
reproductive stressors of individual birds, as a higher infection rate
was noted for older chickens (i.e., 59 week-old) when compared to
younger birds (4 and 10 week-old) (Pantin-Jackwood et al., 2014;
Spackman et al., 2015). Overall, the low levels of viral shedding of
H7N9 by chickens we observed is consistent with some previously
reported work (Ku et al., 2014), but inconsistent with the higher
levels of shedding that have been reported by others (Pantin-
Jackwood et al., 2014). It should be noted that A/Anhui/1/2013 is a
human isolate, and while some human origin H7N9 viruses have
human-associated mutations such as Q217L in the hemagglutinin
and PB2 E627K, several of these strains have been tested in
chickens and replicate well, suggesting that these mutations do
not halt replication in poultry (Spackman et al., 2015).
The current study suggests that quail may pose more of a
transmission threat and subsequent public health threats as
compared to chickens. Although both quail and pigeons were in
cages located directly under the chickens in stack 1 (which housed
one shedding chicken), only the quail shed virus and produced
serologic responses. This suggests that quail are highly susceptible
to this virus, and likely require a small infectious dose for pro-
ductive infections, most likely through the oral route. The premise
that quail require a low infectious dose is supported by a previous
experimental infection study in which high infection rates in
group-housed quail were achieved by 6 DPI with a low inoculum
dose of 102 EID50 (Pantin-Jackwood et al., 2014). Similarly to the
chickens used in the current study, the quail were also young
animals at the initiation of the experiment. Thus, if there is indeed
an effect of age and reproductive status on infection and infectious
dose in chickens, the observation does not appear to be ubiquitous
to all gallinaceous birds, as young but reproductively active quail
(e.g., multiple quail produced eggs during the experiment) were
susceptible to infection from presumably low doses of inoculum
during this experiment. An additional finding of this study is that
quail significantly extended the period during which infectious
virus was excreted in the experimental wet market setting. For
example, chickens were only noted to shed virus up to 4 DPI (3 DPI
for stack 1 and 4 DPI for stack 2). A single quail yielded evidence of
viral shedding on 3 DPI and was shedding at higher levels as
compared to the sole chicken shedding on that day, thereby sug-
gesting that this quail (Quail 32; Table 2) may have been re-
sponsible for infections of the additional quail (n¼3) with which it
was co-housed. This is supported by serological data from this
study, as the two quail that did not initiate viral shedding until
7 DPC had a negative or lower titer antibody response during 13
DPC, as compared to the two quail that initiated shedding earlier
in this stack (Table 2). Following the infection of a single chicken in
stack 1, quail extended the time period that virus was shed in the
Table 2
Viral shedding and antibody titers of birds that seroconverted or shed virus on at
least one occasion during a simulated live animal market experimental transmis-
sion study. No other animals yielded evidence of viral shedding/serologic activity
during the duration of the study.
Animals Serology Virus isolation
ID and location Days post infection (DPI) Shedding characteristics
Bird ID Stackb 13 DPIc 14 DPI 21 DPI Highest
titerd (DPI)
Shedding
duration DPI
Chicken 1a 1 o8e n/a 512 2.3 (3) 1–3
Chicken 2 1 256 n/a o8 None n/a
Chicken 3 1 256 n/a 256 None n/a
Quail 28 1 64 n/a 512 3.9 (9) 5–9
Quail 29 1 32 n/a 128 3.3 (7) 7–9
Quail 32 1 64 n/a 128 3.4 (3 and
5)
3–7
Quail 35 1 o8 n/a 512 3.7 (7) 7–11
Chicken 4a 2 n/a o8 o8 1.9 (4) 4 only
Chicken 5a 2 n/a 256 128 3.0 (2) 2–4
Chicken 6a 2 n/a o8 128 2.5 (4) 4 only
a Animals that were intentionally infected at the initiation of the study.
b Stack refers to the stack of cages an individual animal was associated with
(see Section 2 and Fig. 1).
c DPI¼days post infection of chickens. Quail were not directly infected.
d Titer refers to log10 PFU/mL of oral swab samples. The limit of detection for
oral swabs was 101.0 PFU/mL.
e The limit of detection for the hemagglutination inhibition assay was 1:8.
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current study (Table 2). For obvious reasons, the additional
quantities of virus shed into this system along with the greater
duration of live virus that was detected certainly pose a greater
zoonotic and agricultural threat. This is supported by the results of
earlier experimental infection studies of H7N9 in multiple avian
species in which directly inoculated quail were shown to shed the
highest titer of oral swabs (as high as 107.6 log10 number of
EID50/mL) and to shed as long or longer than any of the other six
species tested (up to 11 DPI) (Pantin-Jackwood et al., 2014).
Considering that pigeons were located under the same infected
chicken as were quail, the lack of evidence of infection in pigeons
suggests that they are far less susceptible to infection with this
virus than are quail. This result is supported by previous ob-
servations suggesting that pigeons, although susceptible to IAVs,
do not typically shed in sufficient quantities to support transmis-
sion cycles of the viruses (Abolnik, 2014). In a recent experimental
infection study, although some pigeons were susceptible to IAV
infection with H7N9, their viral shedding was limited in quantities
and of a short duration as compared to chickens and quail (Pantin-
Jackwood et al., 2014). Similar observations have been noted for
HP IAVS, as the few pigeons that shed following inoculations with
HP H5N1 IAV did so at very low titers (Yamamoto et al., 2012).
Prior studies indicate that shared water sources between
poultry and passerines is a likely source of transmission (Jones
et al., 2014, 2015). While the animals in this experiment did not
share water sources between species, the lack of detectable live
virus in any of the environmental samples (i.e., water and fecal
samples) suggests that water or fecal transmission were not the
primary transmission mechanisms in this study. Thus, one possible
scenario for transmission between chickens and quail is through
poultry feed contaminated with an infectious dose of an oral se-
cretion falling to the cage below containing quail and the sub-
sequent consumption of the feed by quail. No pigeons shed virus
nor seroconverted during the current study, even though they
were housed directly below the same chicken that infected quail
that were housed directly adjacent to the pigeons. This suggests
that a higher dose of virus, such as 106 EID50 (Pantin-Jackwood
et al., 2014), may be needed to infect this species or that this
species is more susceptible by limited routes of infection as com-
pared to the presumed environmental contamination we observed
in quail.
The results of this study suggest that inter-cage transmission
from experimentally infected chickens to naïve chickens is in-
efficient, at least at the dose that and the isolate we used to in-
oculate chickens, which is consistent with previous studies sug-
gesting a high inoculation dose is needed to consistently achieve
contact transmission among co-housed chickens (Spackman et al.,
2015). However, the observed infections in quail warrant further
scrutiny, as row-to-row transmission of H7N9 among quail cages
would appear plausible based on the preliminary results of this
study. Taking into account the results of the current study and a
previous experimental transmission study suggesting that quail
require a small infectious dose of H7N9 in index animals to reach
high infection rates (Pantin-Jackwood et al., 2014), quail may re-
present a key species in susceptibility to and transmission of this
virus in live animal markets when they are present in these
settings.
Although none of the cottontail rabbits acquired IAV infections
during the current study, their roles in inter-species transmission
in live animal market settings should not be discounted. In an
earlier study assessing the shedding capacities of peridomestic
mammals experimentally infected with the same H7N9 as used in
this study, most mammals shed several orders of magnitude
greater than any of the infected birds in the current study (Root
et al., 2016). As such, select mammalian species could produce a
more significant transmission threat for H7N9 in live animal
markets than some commonly associated avian species.
Overall, a key question associated with IAV transmission in live
animal market settings is which index species produce the most
risk for intra- and interspecific transmission. In addition, key
characteristics of various animal species and experimental proce-
dures, such as age, breed, inoculation dose, and viral strain (Pan-
tin-Jackwood et al., 2014; Spackman et al., 2015), as well as other
potential contributing factors, such as sex and experimental lo-
cations of animals in stacked-cage settings need to be addressed.
Once elucidated, this information could help to inform best
management practices in these types of market settings and could
be valuable knowledge for advances in the complex epidemiology
of public health issues associated with emergent H7N9 IAV.
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